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Kentucky's debt relief attempt  
By Stephen E. Lile 
Special to The Courier-Journal 
According to the author of Ecclesiastes, there is nothing new under the  
sun. It is interesting to contrast policymakers' responses to  
current "sub-prime" problems with the debt relief plan attempted in  
Kentucky during the 1820s. A review of the earlier period, often  
referred to as the Panic of 1819, shows that current debt relief  
proposals pale in comparison to the 1820s proposals.  
The economic environment of the two periods differs drastically. Per  
capita GDP today, adjusted for inflation, is almost 30 times the level  
of 1820. In addition, the nature and extent of the debt problems  
differ. Today's problems are centered in the housing industry; the  
problem was more general in the 1820s.  
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Moreover, the events that created the debt problems differed. Former  
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan lays most of the blame on the  
recent "speculative bubble" in the U.S. housing market, and there is  
evidence that fraudulent appraisals and failure of loan originators to  
validate borrower income are contributing factors. Unlike the 1820s,  
deflation at the present time has been limited to the housing market.  
In contrast, the problem in the 1820s was economy-wide deflation  
following the War of 1812. Between 1814 and 1829, prices -- at both  
consumer and wholesale levels -- fell by roughly 50 percent. Deflation  
harms debtors by forcing them to repay dollars which have increased  
purchasing power and that are more difficult to earn. In a very real  
sense, deflation increases the debt burden borne by debtors.  
In the 1820s, a movement arose in Kentucky and other states to provide  
relief to people who had incurred debt when prices and wages were  
higher. The pro-relief forces in Kentucky's General Assembly  
enacted "replevin" legislation that gave debtors two additional years  
to repay loans if creditors refused to accept commonwealth bank notes  
in payment.  
Accepting paper money was not an attractive option for creditors  
because by June 1820, the value of commonwealth of Kentucky bank notes  
had fallen, relative to gold, to 50 cents on the dollar. The Kentucky  
Court of Appeals ruled the replevin legislation unconstitutional. But  
the court's ruling was not popular, and the Kentucky General Assembly  
enacted legislation creating a new Court of Appeals to replace the old  
court.  
(Ron Formisano, William T. Bryan Professor of American History at the  
University of Kentucky, includes this period in his latest book, For  
The People: American Populist Movements from the Revolution to the  
1850s.)  
Public opinion in Kentucky was split between the new court faction,  
composed of those who favored debt relief, and the old court faction,  
made up of those who opposed debt relief. The "New Court-Old Court"  
controversy in Kentucky raged for some time. Kentucky author Robert  
Penn Warren used this conflict as a sub-plot in World Enough and Time.  
A common thread both in the 1820s and in the present-day "sub-prime"  
controversy is the inherent conflict that arises between the interests  
of debtors and creditors during a period of deflation, which currently  
is limited to housing prices. The willingness of policy makers and  
politicians to encourage, if not require, that creditors give debtors  
more time to repay and/or lower interest rates may be appropriate in  
cases involving fraud or in cases where debtors have not fully  
understood the loan agreements they signed.  
In this regard, the Fed's proposals requiring that loan originators  
fully disclose the terms under which loans must be repaid and its  
attempt to curb loan originators' inclination to sign up people with  
questionable ability to repay appear appropriate. While the goal of  
protecting debtors from exploitation is a noble one, the sanctity of  
contracts cannot be ignored.  
The debate over the gold standard associated with William Jennings  
Bryan's candidacy for president in 1896 may be viewed as the high point  
in populist influence in our nation's history. Kentucky's experience in  
the 1820s illustrates the intensity of the conflict between the  
interests of debtors and creditors during periods of deflation. Recent  
events suggest that populist sentiment at the present time does not  
approach the level seen in these earlier periods.  
Stephen E. Lile is professor of economics at Western Kentucky  
University and a past president of the Kentucky Economic Association.  
 
